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I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, wealth buys justice.1 Millions of poor and middleclass Americans are unable to exercise their rights because of unmet civil
legal needs.2 Numerous studies and reports have found that in cases and
administrative matters relating to bankruptcy, housing, family law,
unemployment, domestic violence, healthcare, and consumer fraud,
Americans face a critical lack of legal representation and assistance.3
Despite the due process concerns that motivated the Supreme Court’s
decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, the Court has found no constitutionallymandated right to counsel in a civil case.4 To make matters worse, what
little civil legal aid the United States does provide is underfunded, severely
restricted, and unable to meet demand.5 The United States is virtually
alone among wealthy Western democracies in so inadequately providing
for the indigent with civil legal needs.6 This state of affairs persists despite
studies showing that funding civil legal aid is not a budgetary drain but,
instead, actually saves money and can yield economic growth.7
Providing adequate civil legal aid makes economic sense, but it is also a
legal duty.8
The United States is ignoring its obligations under
1. See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice in the United States:
Narrowing the Gap Between Principle and Practice, in THE STATE OF ACCESS:
SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF DEMOCRACIES TO CREATE EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES 229 (Jorrit
de Jong & Gowher Rizvi eds., 2008) (detailing inequalities and inadequacies in the
justice system for the indigent, middle class, and those representing themselves).
2. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE
CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 1 (2009)
GAP
09],
available
at
[hereinafter
JUSTICE
http://www.lsc.gov/pdfs/documenting_the_justice_gap_in_america_2009.pdf (finding
that half of those seeking civil legal aid are turned away).
3. See infra Appendix 1 (listing studies that detail the extremely low levels of
civil legal aid in the United States).
4. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963) (mandating the
provision of counsel to indigent criminal defendants); see also Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-33 (1981) (finding a presumption against the civil right to
counsel unless a loss of physical liberty is at stake).
5. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (enacting restrictions on the activities the Legal
Services Corporation can legally undertake); JUSTICE GAP 09, supra note 2, at 12, 1618, 28.
6. See Raven Lidman, Civil Gideon As A Human Right: Is the U.S. Going to Join
Step With the Rest of The Developed World?, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 769,
789 (2006) (cataloguing fifty-eight countries with a civil right to counsel and detailing
the nature and scope of that right); see also WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, RULE OF LAW
INDEX
92
(2010),
available
at
http://www.worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/WJP%20Rule%20of%20Law%2
0Index%202010_2.pdf (ranking the United States eleventh out of thirty-five countries
in providing access to justice and worst in its income group and region).
7. See infra Appendix 2 (listing studies demonstrating the economic benefits of
providing civil legal aid).
8. See Charter of the Organization of American States art. 45, opened for
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international law and betraying its founding principles by letting this
neglect continue.9 Americans who must face complex legal issues without
help are unable to functionally exercise their rights.10 The United States is
bound by international agreements to dedicate every effort to providing a
level of civil legal aid that ensures the realization of human rights.11 The
United States is violating those agreements.
This Comment argues that to comply with international law, the United
States should abandon Lassiter v. Department of Social Services’ reasoning
and reform and fully fund the Legal Services Corporation (LSC). Part II
explores international sources of a right to civil legal aid and the failures of
the United States to realize that right.12 Part III argues that the United
States is failing to meet its international legal duty to provide adequate civil
legal aid, as evidenced by the shortcomings of the LSC and the Supreme
Court’s Lassiter decision.13 Part IV recommends that, to meet its
international obligations while avoiding the problems of the current
indigent criminal defense scheme, the United States should implement a
system that utilizes legal services professionals instead of exclusively
relying upon lawyers, drawing on practices from the international
development model of legal empowerment of the poor (LEP).14
signature Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 1609 U.N.T.S. 119 (entered into force Dec. 13,
1951) [hereinafter OAS Charter] (requiring member states to provide civil legal aid).
9. See id.; see also Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342-45 (finding a constitutional due
process right to counsel in a criminal case).
10. See generally Russell Engler, And Justice for All – Including the Unrepresented
Poor: Revisiting the Roles of Judges, Mediators and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987
(1999) [hereinafter Engler, And Justice for All] (examining various empirical reports
detailing the poor success rates of litigants without counsel); Russell Engler,
Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data Reveal About
When Counsel Is Most Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37 (2010) [hereinafter Engler,
Connecting Self-Representation] (surveying quantitative reports showing that
representation is a significant factor in improving a claimant’s chances for success in
eviction, custody, and debt collection cases, as well as in administrative proceedings).
11. See, e.g., Organization of American States, American Convention on Human
Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (requiring adequate
access to counsel to ensure equal protection before the law); International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S.
195 [hereinafter CERD] (requiring the provision of legal representation when basic
human needs are at stake); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (requiring legal aid to secure
the right to housing).
12. See infra Part II (defining the scope of the obligation).
13. See infra Part III (describing the United States’ failure to comply with
international law).
14. See infra Part IV (arguing for the adoption of a new model of civil legal aid that
uses non-lawyers); U.N. COMM’N ON LEGAL EMPOWERMENT OF THE POOR, MAKING THE
LAW
WORK
FOR
EVERYONE
3
(2008),
available
at
http://www.undp.org/legalempowerment/report/Making_the_Law_Work_for_Everyone
.pdf (defining the LEP as “a process of systemic change through which the poor and
excluded become able to use the law, the legal system, and legal services to protect and
advance their rights and interests”).
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BACKGROUND

A. International Sources of a Right to Civil Legal Aid
1.

Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and Civil and Political Rights

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is the aspirational
origin of economic, social, cultural, civil, and political rights.15 Among
other things, the UDHR calls for the protection of the rights to own
property, to work, to social security, and to a fair trial.16 The International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) builds on
this foundation by further detailing rights such as adequate housing, social
security and insurance, labor rights, and education.17 The United States has
ratified the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
which requires procedural fairness in law, non-discrimination and equality
before the law, and the provision of a fair trial.18
The UDHR, ICESCR, and ICCPR mandate a civil right to counsel in
certain circumstances.19 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights has found that under the ICESCR, governments should provide legal
aid to those facing forced evictions.20 The Human Rights Committee has
also encouraged states to provide the indigent with free legal aid in civil
cases and has noted that in some instances, states may even be obligated to

15. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III), at 71 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR] (codifying the concept of
human rights in the world community).
16. See id. at arts. 10, 17, 22-23, 25 (describing the economic, social, civil, and
political rights).
17. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 95-19, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR] (further
explaining the economic, social, and cultural nature of human rights).
18. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14, Dec. 16, 1966,
S. TREATY DOC. NO. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (delineating the
human rights that impact civil and political activity); see also U.S. Reservations,
Declarations, and Understandings, International Convention on Civil and Political
Rights, 138 CONG. REC. 8070-71 (1992) (declaring the non-self-executing nature of the
Covenant, which means that full enforcement of Covenant provisions domestically is
dependent on Congress passing implementing legislation).
19. See Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, Eighth United Nations Congress
on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Aug. 27-Sept. 7,
1990, ¶¶ 8, 11, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 at 118 (1990) (expressing the
international norm of providing effective access to legal services when fundamental
rights are at stake).
20. See Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 7: The
Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11.1) Forced Evictions, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. E/1998/22,
Annex. IV (May 20, 1997) [hereinafter General Comment No. 7] (finding that housing
is a basic human need and its status as such requires protection, including the provision
of counsel to indigents so that they can realize this right).
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do so under Article 14 of the ICCPR.21 As a result, state parties to the
ICCPR often report to the Human Rights Committee on their efforts to
provide counsel in civil matters.22 The Committee has also requested
information on such efforts to assess a country’s compliance with the
ICCPR.23
The Council of Europe embraced these rights on a regional level in the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (ECHR).24 In
Airey v. Ireland, the European Court of Human Rights construed Article 6
of the ECHR, requiring the right to a fair hearing, to mean that indigents
must have “effective access” to courts.25 Effective access requires either
the provision of an attorney or the simplification of a proceeding so that a
layperson would not need a lawyer in order for the hearing to be considered
fair and accessible.26 Subsequent decisions have affirmed the need to
provide legal aid to ensure effective access to the courts.27 In short,
21. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 32: Article 14, Right to
Equality before Courts and Tribunals and To a Fair Trial, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/GC/32 (Aug. 23, 2007) [hereinafter General Comment No.32] (noting that the
availability of legal assistance often determines whether access to a proceeding or
participation in a proceeding can meaningfully be said to exist).
22. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., ICCPR Consideration of Reports
Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant—Fifth Periodic Report:
Canada, ¶ 95, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/CAN/2004/5 (Nov. 18, 2004) (describing Canada’s
legal aid scheme); U.N. Human Rights Comm., ICCPR Consideration of Reports
Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant—Fifth Periodic Report:
Germany, ¶ 190, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/DEU/2002/5 (Dec. 4, 2002) (detailing the
provision of legal aid in Germany).
23. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., ICCPR Consideration of Reports
Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant—Concluding
Observations: Czech Republic, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/CZE/CO/2 (Aug. 9, 2007)
(noting with concern the lack of legal aid for Roma victims of discrimination); U.N.
Human Rights Comm., ICCPR Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
Under Article 40 of the Covenant—Concluding Observations: Chile, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/CHL/CO/5 (May 18, 2007) (encouraging Chile to provide legal aid to
workers so that their complaints can be heard).
24. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 6, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR] (applying the
normative human rights framework of the UDHR to Europe); see also PIERRE-HENRI
TEITGEN, REPORT TO THE CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE ON
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COLLECTIVE GUARANTEE OF ESSENTIAL FREEDOMS AND
FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS
¶
6
(1949),
available
at
http://assembly.coe.int/Conferences/2009Anniversaire49/DocRef/Teitgen6.pdf
(drawing on the UDHR while drafting the ECHR).
25. See Airey v. Ireland, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21 (1979) (noting that
effective access to the courts ensures the protection of civil, political, economic, and
social rights).
26. See id. (recognizing that the protection of rights is paramount over the form of
assistance that ensures such protection).
27. See, e.g., Steel v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. 22 (2005) (holding that the
legal and factual complexity of the case obligated the UK to provide counsel); Bertuzzi
v. France, 2003-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 117 (2003) (requiring the provision of representation
when it has been deemed crucial to a case); Aerts v. Belgium, 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. 50
(1998) (stating that denying qualifying citizens access to legal aid is a denial of the
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international interpretive bodies have found that the similarly-articulated
rights of the UDHR, ICESCR, ICCPR, and ECHR require a similar
protection–the provision of civil legal aid.28
2.

Other U.N. Conventions Also Mandate Civil Legal Aid

The United States has ratified the Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), which protects numerous civil,
political, economic, social, and cultural rights.29 Under the CERD, state
parties must prohibit and eliminate racial discrimination and must
guarantee equality before the law.30 The United States is one of only two
countries to have signed but not ratified the Convention on the Rights of
the Child (CRC) and the only state to have signed but not ratified the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW).31
The CERD, CRC, and CEDAW create interpretive and monitoring
bodies which have all found that full compliance with their respective
conventions requires providing civil legal aid in certain circumstances.32
The CERD Committee has stressed that full compliance with the CERD
requires free access to interpreters and legal aid for victims of racism to

right to a tribunal); Andronicou v. Cyprus, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. 389, ¶ 199 (1997) (declining
to specify a particular legal aid scheme but reaffirming that access to the courts must be
guaranteed for indigents).
28. Compare ECHR, supra note 24, at art. 6 (“In the determination of his civil
rights and obligations . . . everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”), with
ICCPR, supra note 18, at art. 14 (“All persons shall be equal before the courts and
tribunals. In the determination . . . of his rights and obligations in a suit at law,
everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and
impartial tribunal established by law.”), and UDHR, supra note 15, at art. 10
(“Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent
and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations . . . .”).
29. See CERD, supra note 11 (requiring countries to ensure the dignity and
inherent equality of all people by prohibiting and redressing racial discrimination); U.S.
Initial Rep. to the Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Addendum, §
B5, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/351/Add.1 (Sept. 21, 2000) (describing the United States’
efforts to comply with CERD); see also 140 CONG. REC. 14,326-27 (1994) (ratifying
CERD).
30. See CERD, supra note 11, at art. 5 (listing rights that state parties must protect).
31. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter CRC] (requiring states to protect the human rights of children); Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979,
1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW] (defining what constitutes discrimination
against women and obligating countries to prevent and redress such discrimination).
32. See CRC, supra note 31, at arts. 43-45 (establishing monitoring bodies that
solicit reports from countries, gauge country compliance with their respective
agreements, and provide advice on how countries can better comply); CEDAW, supra
note 31, at arts. 17-22 (establishing the same); CERD, supra note 11, at arts. 8-14 (also
creating the same).
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facilitate bringing actions to court.33 Victims of discrimination based on
descent should also receive legal aid.34 The CERD Committee’s report on
the United States’ compliance recommended that the United States fund
legal representation of indigent racial, ethnic, and national minorities in
civil proceedings, particularly when basic human needs such as housing,
health care, and child custody are at stake.35
The CRC Committee has stressed that full compliance with the CRC
requires states to remove barriers to the adequate administration of juvenile
justice and has called on states to ensure legal assistance for juveniles.36
Finally, the CEDAW Committee has also reiterated, both in its
commentary on the CEDAW and in its reports on country compliance, that
providing legal aid is often necessary to protect the rights of women
enshrined in the CEDAW.37 Thus, like the UDHR, ICESCR, and ICCPR,
the CERD, CRC, and CEDAW have also established that civil legal aid is a
necessary condition for the enjoyment of the human rights they protect.

33. See U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General
Recommendation No. 31: Prevention of Racial Discrimination in the Administration
and Functioning of the Criminal Justice System, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc. A/60/18; GAOR 60th
Sess., Supp. No. 18, 98-108 (Oct. 3, 2005) [hereinafter General Recommendation No.
31] (addressing, but not limiting, this requirement to the criminal context).
34. See U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General
Recommendation No. 29: Discrimination Based on Descent, ¶ 5(u), U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/Rev.9 (Vol. II) (Jan. 11, 2002) (reiterating that discrimination based on
descent is also prohibited under the CERD).
35. U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Consideration of
Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 9 of the Convention—Concluding
Observations: United States of America, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/USA/CO/6 (May 8,
2008) [hereinafter CERD Report USA] (noting that the lack of a generally recognized
right to counsel in civil proceedings has a disproportionate impact on racial, ethnic, and
national minorities).
36. See, e.g., U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 10:
Children’s Rights in Juvenile Justice, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/10 (Apr. 25, 2007)
(recommending increased access to legal aid for minors); U.N. Comm. on the Rights of
the Child, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 44 of the
Convention: Concluding Observations of the Comm. on the Rights of the Child—
China, ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.56 (June 7, 1996) (requiring better protection of
the rights of children in China); see also U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child,
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 44 of the
Convention: Concluding Observations of the Comm. on the Rights of the Child—
Lebanon, ¶ 43, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.54 (June 7, 1996) (requiring better protection
of the rights of children in Lebanon).
37. See, e.g., U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,
General Recommendation No. 21: Equality in Marriage and Family Relations, U.N.
Doc. A/47/38 (Apr. 12, 1994) (noting that to have equality before the law, women
should not be barred, legally or financially, from legal advice or access to court); see
also U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Rep. of the
CEDAW, ¶ 110, U.N. Doc. A/57/38; GAOR 57th Sess., Supp. No. 38, 90-94 (2002)
(critiquing Saint Kitts and Nevis’ lack of legal aid for women).
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The Inter-American System

The Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS Charter) and
the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (ADR) contain
rights to civil legal aid, equality before the law, due process, and a fair
trial.38 The United States signed and ratified the OAS Charter in 1948.39
The United States has signed but not ratified the American Convention on
Human Rights, which complements the other two OAS documents.40
Nonetheless, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights consider all three documents to
be interrelated and enforce their provisions against all members that have
ratified the OAS Charter.41 Those two bodies have found that to fully
protect the human rights guaranteed by the Inter-American system, states
must guarantee adequate access to counsel and civil legal aid.42
4.

Civil Legal Aid is Adequate Only if it Ensures the Protection of Rights.

What the obligation to provide legal aid requires depends on the
circumstance and may not always necessitate the provision of counsel. In
some instances, waiving or eliminating court fees or providing interpreters
free of charge may suffice.43 The CERD Committee has cited free legal
help, advice centers, legal information centers, and centers for conciliation
38. See OAS Charter, supra note 8 (establishing the OAS and applying human
rights norms to the Americas); Organization of American States, American Declaration
of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, reprinted in Basic Documents
Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OAS/Ser.L/V/I.4/Rev.9
(Jan. 31, 2003); 43 AJIL Supp. 133 (1949) [hereinafter ADR] (defining human rights
under the OAS system).
39. See OAS Charter, supra note 8, Signatories and Ratifications (establishing the
United States as a founding member).
40. See American Convention on Human Rights, Signatories and Ratifications,
opened for signature July 18, 1978, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (further elaborating the human
rights guarantees of the OAS system).
41. See, e.g., Ramos v. United States, Case P4446/02, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
Report No. 61/03, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118, doc. 70 rev. 2 at 457 (2003) (finding that the
United States’ ratification of the OAS Charter obligates its compliance with the
American Declaration because the Declaration contains and defines the human rights
set out in the OAS Charter); Joseph v. Canada, Case 11.092, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
Report No. 27/93, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.85, doc. 9 rev. 32 (1994) (denying admissibility of a
claim but applying the American Convention while acknowledging that Canada has not
ratified the Convention).
42. See Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Access to Justice As a Guaranty of Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights: A Review of the Standards Adopted by the Inter-American
System of Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.129 doc. 4, ¶ II(a), (Sept. 7, 2007)
[hereinafter Inter-American Commission] (recognizing that if indigence prevents a
person from using the law to assert rights protected by the Convention because they
cannot afford counsel, then that person is being discriminated against and is not
receiving equal protection before the law).
43. See General Comment No. 32, supra note 21, ¶¶ 10-14 (explaining that
achieving equality of access to courts is more important than the means by which that
access is achieved).
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and mediation as methods of providing legal aid.44 However, where basic
human needs such as housing, health care, child custody, or liberty are at
stake, treaty-monitoring bodies have been specific in their calls for “legal
representation of indigent persons.”45
The European Court of Human Rights has found that complexity is the
determinative criterion for deciding when a lawyer must be provided.46 If a
proceeding is so legally and factually complex that an indigent layperson
would be unfairly disadvantaged without counsel, professional assistance is
crucial to a case, or if procedures are complicated and inaccessible, the
state must provide counsel.47
Under the Inter-American system, the nature of the right at stake and the
complexity of the issue at hand both are considered when determining
whether counsel is required.48 The Inter-American Commission requires a
determination based on “a) the resources available to the person concerned;
b) the complexity of the issues involved; and, c) the significance of the
rights involved.”49
Taken as a whole, the duty to provide adequate civil legal aid
necessitates different tiers of assistance, with the requirement of access to
assistance setting the floor.50 At their core, the United States’ obligations
are about protecting rights.51 Legal aid is a method for achieving this, and
that method must adjust to the needs of the person, the nature of the right,
and the legal system.52 Where the right is fundamental or the complexity is
overwhelming, the United States must provide indigents with a lawyer.53
44. See General Recommendation No. 31, supra note 33, ¶¶ 6-9 (recognizing that
remedies for victims of racism can only be ensured if effective access to justice is
provided).
45. See CRC, supra note 31, at art. 37 (requiring legal assistance when a child’s
liberty is at stake); CERD Report USA, supra note 35 (recommending the provision of
counsel when basic human needs are at stake); General Comment No. 7, supra note 20,
¶ 15 (recommending legal aid a as a procedural protection when forced evictions take
place).
46. See Steel v. United Kingdom, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 22 ¶¶ 59-72 (2005) (holding that
the legal and factual complexity of the case necessitated the provision of counsel).
47. See id. (mandating civil legal aid); Bertuzzi v. France, 2003-III2 Eur. Ct. H.R.
117 (2003) (same); Airey v. Ireland, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21 (1979) (same).
48. See Inter-American Comm’n, supra note 42, ¶¶ 3-6 (describing the access to
justice standards of the Inter-American system).
49. Id. ¶ 56.
50. See id. ¶¶ 3, 6 (noting that states have the obligation to remove economic
obstacles that prevent access to the courts).
51. See CRC, supra note 31 (defining human rights and the obligations of countries
to respect, protect, and fulfill those rights); CEDAW, supra note 31 (same); CERD,
supra note 11 (same); ICCPR, supra note 18 (same); ICESCR, supra note 17; (same);
OAS Charter, supra note 8 (same); UDHR, supra note 15 (same).
52. See Inter-American Commission, supra note 42, ¶ 56 (establishing the criteria
for determining what level of assistance to provide).
53. See id. ¶ 7 (requiring assistance when a case is technically complex); CERD
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Where a right may be effectively enforced or protected without the use of
counsel, but realization of the right still requires assistance, the United
States must ensure access to that assistance.54 This obligation is a legal
one, derived from international agreements that have already proven
persuasive in United States courts.55
B. The State of Civil Legal Aid in the United States
1.

A Failure of the Courts

Prior to 1981, the Supreme Court was developing a line of judicial
reasoning that evidenced growing support for the provision of counsel to
indigents in civil proceedings.56 This reasoning was based on due process
and the right to be heard and did not focus on whether a loss of personal
liberty was at stake.57 Those decisions reflected the Court’s long-held
belief that assistance of counsel is critical to fairness in the judicial system,
particularly when indigence is a barrier to legal assistance.58
The seminal criminal case in this area, Gideon v. Wainwright,
demonstrates this principle. In Gideon, the Court found that an indigent
defendant facing loss of personal liberty required the assistance of a
lawyer, not because the possibility of jail necessitated it, but because of the
danger of having an unfair trial otherwise.59
The potential for
Report USA, supra note 35 (requiring assistance when basic human needs are at stake).
54. See Steel v. United Kingdom, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 22 (2005) (interpreting the duty
to provide legal aid based on human rights which must also be enforced by the United
States); Bertuzzi v. France, 2003-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 117 (2003) (same); Airey v. Ireland,
32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21 (1979) (same).
55. See infra Appendix 3 (listing cases in the United States that discussed and cited
international law).
56. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-71 (1970) (recognizing the
relationship between the right to counsel and the right to be heard, and the need to
consider capacities and circumstances to determine if someone can exercise that right).
57. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 575-77 (1975) (finding that a personal liberty
loss is not required to implicate due process); Mayer v. City of Chi., 404 U.S. 189, 19699 (1971) (finding no constitutional difference between a fine and a loss of personal
liberty in providing a record of the proceedings for use on appeal to an indigent
defendant); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376-82 (1971) (determining that a
court-fee structure denied due process to indigents seeking divorce despite the civil
nature of the proceeding, involving no loss of liberty).
58. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355-58 (1963) (discussing
discrimination against the indigent, and finding a right to counsel on appeal in a
criminal case); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963) (establishing the
right to counsel for indigents in criminal proceedings on due process grounds); Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) (reasoning that in a criminal case, even an
educated and intelligent person needs the guidance of counsel at every step to ensure a
fair trial).
59. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-45 (reasoning that individuals facing legal
proceedings who cannot afford a lawyer cannot be assured a fair trial unless a lawyer is
provided for them).
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imprisonment raised the stakes, but it was the unfairness of the proceeding
that would trigger that potential deprivation of liberty that implicated the
due process clause.60
In 1981, the Supreme Court ruled in Lassiter v. Department of Social
Services that, unlike in the criminal context, there is no inherent right to
counsel in a civil proceeding.61 The Court instead found that a due process
inquiry should be conducted on a case-by-case basis.62 This inquiry
consists in the first part of a three-factor balancing test adopted from
Mathews v. Eldridge.63 The test considers (1) the private interest affected
by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that
interest through procedures and the likely value of additional or different
procedural safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest and resulting
fiscal and administrative burdens that would result from additional or
replacement procedures.64 In the second part of the inquiry, the results of
the test are weighed against a presumption that there is no right to counsel
except when losing the case would result in the loss of personal liberty.65
The Lassiter decision, therefore, effectively ties the right to counsel in a
civil proceeding to a personal liberty interest.66
State courts have overwhelmingly treated the Supreme Court’s decision
as if it meant that the appointment of counsel is never required in a civil
proceeding.67 This is a misinterpretation of the Court’s holding that the
appointment of counsel is merely not always required, depending on the
outcome of a case-by-case due process analysis.68
The courts that have actually engaged in the due process analysis
60. See id. at 345 (arguing that without a lawyer, a proceeding is unfair because
even the intelligent and educated layman may not be able to navigate the procedural
and evidentiary complexities of the courtroom).
61. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-33 (1981) (failing to
extend the logic of Gideon to the civil context in a case dealing with termination of
parental rights).
62. See id. at 31-32 (adopting a case-by-case approach to due process described in
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973)).
63. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
64. See id.
65. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25-27 (construing a liberty interest as the heaviest
factor to be weighed).
66. See id. at 26 (“[A]s a litigant’s interest in personal liberty diminishes, so does
his right to appointed counsel”).
67. See Clare Pastore, Life After Lassiter: An Overview of State Court Right-toCounsel Decisions, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 186 (2006) (reviewing approximately
500 published state court decisions that deal with a right to counsel and cite Lassiter,
and finding that most of them ignore the case-by-case analysis in favor of a blanket
denial of counsel).
68. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27, 33 (weighing the Mathews factors against a
presumption against the right to counsel and finding no such right in these
circumstances).
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envisioned by Lassiter have developed precedent showing that the
appointment of counsel is sometimes required in civil proceedings.69
Across the country, courts have held that where a state statute affords
counsel to parents in a state-initiated termination of parental rights
proceeding, counsel must be afforded in privately-initiated termination
cases as well.70 In addition, many impassioned dissents have argued that
the state should provide counsel to indigents because the reasoning behind
Lassiter was flawed.71
2.

A Failure of the Federal Government

The Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) was established in 1964 to
address systemic causes of poverty by collaborating with regional legal
services providers to advocate and bring test cases before courts and
administrative bodies.72 In 1974, the Legal Services Corporation (LSC),
which had a much more limited mandate, replaced the OEO.73 The LSC
has been prohibited from its inception from funding the filing of class
action lawsuits, class action appeals, or amicus curiae class actions, and it
may not lobby for the passage or defeat of any federal or state legislation.74
This reflects a shift in purpose from the OEO’s efforts to address systemic
causes of poverty to the LSC’s mandate to focus on specific legal needs.75
69. See, e.g., Pasqua v. Council, 892 A.2d 663, 669-73 (N.J. 2006) (finding that
when indigent parents are subject to coercive incarceration for violating child support
orders, they have a right to appointed counsel under the federal and state constitutions);
Bellevue Sch. Dist. v. E.S., 199 P.3d 1010, 1013-20 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (holding
that in a child truancy proceeding, the child must be afforded counsel), rev’d en banc,
257 P.3d 570 (Wash. 2011).
70. See, e.g., In re K.L.J., 813 P.2d 276, 279, 286 (Alaska 1991) (holding that
equal protection and due process require the appointment of counsel); In re Adoption
of K.L.P., 763 N.E.2d 741, 751 (Ill. 2002) (same); In re S.A.J.B., 679 N.W.2d 645, 650
(Iowa 2004) (same); In re Adoption of K.A.S., 499 N.W.2d 558, 567 (N.D. 2004)
(same); Zockert v. Fanning, 800 P.2d 773, 777-78 (Or. 1990) (same).
71. See, e.g., Quail v. Mun. Court, 217 Cal. Rptr. 361, 364 (Ct. App. 1985)
(Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (calling for a right to counsel for
an indigent tenant defending an unlawful detainer); In re McBride, 766 N.W.2d 857,
858 (Mich. 2009) (Corrigan, J. and Kelly, C.J., dissenting from order denying
certiorari) (arguing that denying a father access to counsel during proceedings
terminating his parental rights violated state and federal law).
72. See Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2701 (1964) (repealed
1981) (establishing a legal corps to fight systemic poverty through civil and
administrative legal representation).
73. See Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C § 2996 (1974) (amended 1977)
(amending the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964) (creating the LSC to supplant the
legal activities of the OEO).
74. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(d) (listing congressionally imposed restrictions on
activities).
75. See The Law: Corporation for the Poor, TIME MAG., July 28, 1975,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,913362,00.html (describing the
philosophical shift in mission from the OEO to the LSC that reflects the political
change in Washington).
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The LSC uses congressionally-appropriated funds to make grants to
regional legal services providers who then assist those who qualify
financially.76 In 1981, Congress appropriated $321.3 million to the LSC,
which is the closest Congress has ever come to ensuring that the LSC’s
level of funding keeps pace with the rate of inflation.77
Since that high-water mark, the LSC’s funding levels have dropped
while restrictions on its activities have grown.78 After President Reagan
attempted to de-fund the LSC in 1981, its funding levels never fully
rebounded.79 The result of this underfunding is that the LSC cannot meet
the demand for its services.80 Years of research by the LSC consistently
shows that nearly eighty percent of civil legal need in the United States
goes unmet.81 Additionally, the LSC turns away about half of those
seeking assistance from LSC-funded legal aid organizations because the
organization lacks resources.82
The dearth of LSC assistance due to a lack of funding is exacerbated by
restrictive limitations placed on the LSC in 1996.83 The 1996 restrictions
prohibit LSC-funded programs from working on redistricting cases,

76. See § 2996e(a)(1) (providing the only direct source of federal funds for civil
legal aid).
77. See ALAN W. HOUSEMAN & LINDA E. PERLE, CTR. FOR LAW AND SOC. POLICY,
SECURING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR ALL: A BRIEF HISTORY OF CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
26,
38
(2007),
available
at
http://www.clasp.org/admin/site/publications/files/0158.pdf (detailing the persistent
inadequacy of LSC funding over time). See generally LEGAL SERVS. CORP., BUDGET
REQUEST
FISCAL
YEAR
2012
(2011),
available
at
http://lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/lscgov4/FY2012BudgetRequest.pdf
(describing
the LSC’s modest funding increase request).
78. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (enacting new restrictions on the LSC and LSCfunded organization activities); Evan Thomas & Bennett Beach, Law: One More
MAG.
Nov.
23,
1981,
Narrow
Escape,
TIME
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,922707,00.html
(describing
President Reagan’s efforts to zero-fund the agency which eventually resulted in a
twenty-five percent reduction in funding and more restrictions on LSC activities).
79. See HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 77, at 29-33 (explaining how political
pressure from the White House resulted in dramatic cuts to LSC funding and a loss of
political independence).
80. See JUSTICE GAP 09, supra note 2, at 1 (describing the long-standing gap
between available services and need).
81. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE
CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS Preface (2007)
[hereinafter JUSTICE GAP 07] (incorporating new state-level surveys in an updated
report finding a continued gap between legal need and assistance available in the
United States).
82. See JUSTICE GAP 09, supra note 2, at 1 (describing the funding and service gap
between demonstrated need and availability).
83. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act § 501 (enacting
new restrictions on the LSC and LSC-funded organization activities which further
inhibit access to legal aid as well as the types of activities permitted).
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abortion cases, cases regarding certain types of aliens, on behalf of
prisoners, or on behalf of people in public housing evictions who have been
charged with drug crimes that are alleged to threaten the health or public
safety of public housing residents or employees.84 The restrictions also
foreclose LSC-funded programs from advocacy or representation before
legislative bodies or administrative rulemaking proceedings.85 Until
Congress repealed the restriction in 2010, programs funded by the LSC
could not claim, collect, or retain attorneys’ fees from adverse parties, even
when doing so would be permitted otherwise.86 Additionally, since 1996,
the LSC has been required to identify potential client plaintiffs by name.87
The 1996 restrictions apply to any organization accepting LSC funding,
so legal services providers that accept LSC funding cannot engage in any
activity forbidden by Congress in the Legal Services Act, even if they want
to do so using non-LSC funds.88 Largely as a result of these restrictions,
many legal service providers have declined LSC funding.89 In Washington,
D.C. and thirty-seven states, more legal service providers used non-LSC
funds than accepted LSC grants in 2005.90 Much like indigent civil
litigants, legal aid providers must struggle to make do without federal help.
3.

A Failure of the State Governments

Some state governments have attempted to fill the gaps left by the LSC
by implementing their own civil legal aid programs, but these programs are
limited in scope.91 In California, the legislature enacted the Sargent Shriver
Civil Counsel Act, which creates a right to counsel for low-income parties

84. See id.
85. See Legal Services Corporation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88 Stat. 378 (1974)

(enacting restrictions that reflect the shift away from the political philosophy that had
previously enabled the OEO’s broader activities).
86. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 1609, 1610, 1642 (2011) (promulgating a new agency rule in
accordance with the changed authorizing statute that now allows the collection and
retention of attorneys’ fees).
87. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)-(b) (potentially discouraging potential plaintiffs who
must be identified by name, even if the case is sensitive or involves a minor).
88. See § 2996f.
89. See ALAN HOUSEMAN, CTR. FOR LAW AND SOC. POLICY, THE FUTURE OF CIVIL
LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES 3-6 (2005) (detailing the decline in legal services
providers accepting LSC funds).
90. See id. at 6 (reflecting the shift away from accepting restrictive LSC funding).
91. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.5075(2), (5) (West 2011) (providing an attorney to
children applying for special immigrant juvenile status); 2010 LA. SESS. LAW SERV.
ACT 738 (West 2011) (providing an attorney to children in termination of parental
rights proceedings); ASSEMBLY B. NO. A01310, REG. SESS. (N.Y. 2011), available at
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&bn=+A01310%09%09&Summary=Y&A
ctions=Y&Votes=Y&Text=Y (pending before Housing Committee) (providing a
lawyer to indigents during certain types of mortgage foreclosure actions).
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facing critical issues of basic human needs.92 The Act is still in pilot
testing and it remains to be seen if its scope will be expanded.93
Encouragingly, the rationale and language of the Act are reflective of
efforts by the American Bar Association (ABA) to implement a civil right
to counsel at the state level, indicating that the ABA’s efforts may be
producing results.94
III. ANALYSIS
The United States has been described as a “settler’s society,” where the
pioneer spirit of making it on one’s own is more highly valued than the
norms of social justice and collective responsibility found in human rights
agreements.95
This contention may explain the country’s historic
predisposition, but it does not excuse its violations of international law.
The international agreements the United States has ratified, as well as those
it has signed, require the provision of adequate civil legal aid to ensure that
the human rights they articulate are protected.96 Because legal aid is a
means of realizing those rights, such aid is adequate only when it results in
a person being able to exercise and protect their rights.97 The decision to
underfund and restrict the LSC and the high bar set by Lassiter do not
allow for this, and as such, are evidence of an obligation ignored and a

92. See Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 68650 (West 2011)
(listing qualifying basic human needs, such as housing-related matters, domestic
violence and civil harassment restraining orders, probate conservatorships,
guardianships of the person, elder abuse, or actions by a parent to obtain sole legal or
physical custody of a child).
93. See id.
94. See Am. Bar Ass’n, House of Delegates Resolution 112A on Civil Right to
Counsel (Aug. 7, 2006) [hereinafter ABA Resolution], available at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/downloads/06A112A.pdf (endorsing the
civil right to counsel where basic human needs like shelter, sustenance, health or child
custody are at stake). Compare AM. BAR ASS’N., STATE BASIC ACCESS ACT (2008),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/legalservices/sclaid
/atjresourcecenter/downloads/ca_state_basic_access_act_feb_08.authcheckdam.pdf
(providing legislative findings, definitions, and statutory language), with Sargent
Shriver Civil Counsel Act § 68650 (reporting findings similar to those of the ABA and
adopting very similar statutory language).
95. See Bas De Gaay Fortman, Poverty as a Failure of Entitlement: Do RightsBased Approaches Make Sense?, in INTERNATIONAL POVERTY LAW: AN EMERGING
DISCOURSE 34, 36-38 (Lucy Williams ed., 2006) (explaining the difficulty of applying
public justice rights to a settler’s society predicated on individual autonomy); Derek C.
Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 570, 575
(1983) (discussing the individualistic nature of American society).
96. See generally UDHR, supra note 15 (defining rights that have been interpreted
to require civil legal aid to ensure their protection); ICESCR, supra note 17 (same);
ICCPR, supra note 18 (same); CRC, supra note 31 (same); CEDAW, supra note 31
(same); CERD, supra note 29 (same); OAS Charter, supra note 8 (same).
97. See Inter-American Commission, supra note 42, ¶ 1 (explaining that the OAS
recognizes the link between access to justice and the realization of rights).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol20/iss1/9

16

ZARNOW 11/8/2011

11/30/2011 4:33:27 PM

Zarnow: Obligation Ignored: Why International Law Requires the United Sta

2011]

OBLIGATION IGNORED

289

violation of international law.98 The persuasive power of international
norms and jurisprudence, and the binding obligations of international law
require the United States to change its ways.99
A. Lassiter Was Decided Incorrectly Because the Decision Conflates the
Due Process Right to a Lawyer with a Personal Liberty Interest and this
Frustrates Compliance with International Law Which Demands the
Provision of Legal Representation when Basic Human Needs are at Stake
or a Proceeding is Too Complex for a Layperson to Adequately Represent
Themselves.
1. Lassiter Was Decided Incorrectly Because Whether There is a Due
Process Right to the Provision of Counsel Does Not Turn on Whether
There is a Personal Liberty Interest at Stake.
The Supreme Court got Lassiter wrong for the same reasons it got
Gideon right. In Gideon, the Court rejected the Betts v. Brady case-by-case
determination of whether a defendant needed the assistance of counsel,
finding instead that there must be an absolute right to counsel in criminal
cases to ensure a fair trial.100 The Gideon Court noted that its precedent
supported such an extension and that reason and reflection plainly indicated
that assistance of counsel is necessary to ensure procedural fairness.101 In
Lassiter, the Court swung the other way, and found in favor of a case-bycase approach to determining if counsel is required, based in large part on
the lack of personal liberty loss at stake in a civil trial.102 The Court came
to this conclusion despite precedent leading up to Lassiter, which supported
the extension of the right to counsel to indigents in civil proceedings on due
process grounds, without tying this right to concerns for physical liberty.103
The courts below had been less concerned with whether the judicial process
98. See id. (finding that states must remove regulatory, social, and economic
obstacles that prevent or hinder access to justice).
99. See CERD Report USA, supra note 35 (urging the United States to provide
civil legal aid so as to ensure access to remedies for victims of racial discrimination).
100. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (describing the Sixth
Amendment’s guarantee of counsel as a fundamental right applicable to the states).
101. See id. at 343-44 (noting that Betts represented a sharp break from precedent).
102. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981) (adopting the
case-by-case approach from Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973)).
103. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 575-77 (1975) (finding that a personal liberty
loss is not required to implicate due process); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,
376-82 (1971) (ruling that a court-fee system denied due process to indigents seeking
divorce despite the civil nature of the proceeding); Mayer v. City of Chi., 404 U.S. 189,
196-199 (1971) (requiring the provision of the record for use on appeal by an indigent
defendant after a finding that there is no constitutional difference between a fine and
loss of personal liberty); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-71 (1970) (reasoning
that the right to be heard is connected to the right to counsel).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2011

17

ZARNOW 11/8/2011

11/30/2011 4:33:27 PM

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 9

290

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 20:1

would result in physical liberty loss than with ensuring that the process was
fair.104
In Gideon, the Court recognized that the loss of liberty is a punishment
so severe that counsel must always be provided to ensure a fair trial.105 The
Court did not, however, tie the right to counsel to the severity of the
deprivation, either by length or type (maximum security, solitary
confinement, possibility of parole, etc.).106 Lassiter contradicts Gideon by
holding that it is precisely the severity of the deprivation that dictates
whether counsel is required, a position expressly rejected by the Gideon
court.107 In the civil context, the disadvantages an indigent faces because
of a lack of assistance can also lead to life-altering deprivations, many of
which deal with basic human needs.108 The loss of a civil case may result
in the loss of child custody, a home, a job, or healthcare.109
In Lassiter, the Justices’ policy concerns prompted an abrupt departure
from precedent and led to a skewed balancing test.110 Simply put, the
Justices were worried that if they granted a right to counsel in this case,
they would have to grant a right to counsel in all civil cases.111 An in-depth
examination of their private papers and conference notes demonstrates that
the path clearly marked by precedent and constitutional analysis was
abandoned in favor of judicial restraint and deference to the legislature.112
It was those policy concerns that made the right to counsel in civil cases
subordinate to personal liberty interests, instead of properly extending the
Gideon logic of procedural fairness to cases where basic human needs are
104. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963) (“[T]here can be no equal
justice when the type of appeal a man enjoys ‘depends on the amount of money he
has.’”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932) (finding that the guidance of
counsel is crucial to procedural fairness).
105. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 337-40 (stating that due process is implicated by the
potential for personal liberty loss as a result of an unfair proceeding).
106. See id. at 342-43 (providing a blanket right to counsel, irrespective of the
nature of the personal liberty loss).
107. See id. at 344-45 (noting that it is procedural fairness that implicates the need
for a lawyer without tying this need to the severity of the personal liberty loss at stake).
108. See ABA Resolution, supra note 94, at 13 (defining basic human needs as
including, at a minimum, shelter, sustenance, safety, health, and child custody).
109. See, e.g., Engler, Connecting Self-Representation, supra note 10, at 44-67
(describing the potential repercussions of losing a civil case and demonstrating through
empirical research that representation significantly increases the chances of litigant
success).
110. See Robert Hornstein, The Right to Counsel in Civil Cases Revisited: The
Proper Influence of Poverty and the Case for Reversing Lassiter v. Department of
Social Services, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 1057, 1089 (2010) (exploring the policy concerns
and private papers of the Justices).
111. See id. at 1089 (quoting Justice Powell’s concern: “if we reverse, what
principle will prevent a vast extension of [the] right to counsel?”).
112. See id. at 1089-91 (describing the Justices’ concerns about the broader practical
and economic effects of finding a civil right to counsel).
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at stake.113 The Justices created a mis-calibrated balancing test that accords
more weight to personal liberty than to basic human needs, and underweighs the devastating impact that a lack of counsel has upon litigant
success and due process.114 The test is flawed, as evidenced by the lower
courts’ struggles to apply its reasoning and the gradual emergence of
recognized situations where the provision of counsel is required.115
2. Lassiter Frustrates Compliance with International Law Because it
Mandates a Presumption Against the Provision of Counsel in Situations
Where International Law Would Require Such a Provision.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the United States must
respect and comply with international law and has accordingly looked to
international and foreign precedent for guidance on domestic issues.116
Quite recently in Roper v. Simmons and Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme
Court cited international human rights instruments, laws of other countries,
and decisions by the European Court of Human Rights when finding that
executing juveniles and criminalizing consensual homosexual conduct is
unconstitutional.117
The Lassiter Court had the same international guidance available, but
chose to ignore it. Just two years prior to the Lassiter decision, the
European Court of Human Rights decided the landmark case of Airey v.
Ireland in favor of the right to counsel in civil cases.118 Airey dealt with a
battered woman’s struggle to obtain a divorce without a lawyer, a situation
that is sadly common in the United States.119 Like the United States now,

113. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981) (construing the loss
of physical liberty that could result from losing litigation as the critical factor in the
analysis).
114. See Engler, Connecting Self-Representation, supra note 10, at 44-67
(cataloguing empirical studies that describe the poor success rates of unrepresented
litigants in civil cases).
115. See Bellevue Sch. Dist. v. E.S., 199 P.3d 1010, 1016-17 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009)
(finding the right to counsel for children in truancy proceedings), rev’d en banc, 257
P.3d 570 (Wash. 2011); Pastore, supra note 67 (describing a trend in state courts of not
applying the balancing test).
116. See infra Appendix 3 (listing instances where international law has been used
in United States courts).
117. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574-76 (2005) (overturning Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), and prohibiting the death penalty for juveniles under
eighteen); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576-77 (2003) (overturning Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), and holding that a statute criminalizing consensual
homosexual sexual conduct violated the Due Process Clause).
118. See 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21 (1979) (requiring all members of the Council
of Europe to provide a civil right to counsel).
119. See id. ¶¶ 8-9 (describing Mrs. Airey’s indigence and years of struggle to
separate from her physically-abusive husband who would not agree to a divorce).
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at the time, Ireland had no civil right to counsel for indigents.120 The
European Court held that effective access to the courts, a key element in
ensuring the realization of human rights, could not be said to exist where
indigents are denied legal assistance.121 The Airey court’s decision is not
binding upon the United States, but it was based on an interpretation of
language in the ECHR that is almost identical to language found in the
ICCPR and UDHR, both of which the United States had signed at that
time.122 Despite this, the Lassiter court did not consider the Airey
decision.123 The Lassiter Court’s initial disregard for international
precedent begat an ongoing violation of international law.
The Lassiter decision is an example of judicial action that runs counter
to the human rights agreements that bind the United States.124 The United
States has signed, ratified, and agreed to abide by the ICCPR, CERD, OAS
Charter, and ADR.125 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the
Inter-American Commission in particular have made it clear that this
ratification means that the OAS Charter and ADR apply to the United
States.126 According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the
United States must make a good faith effort to adhere to the object,
purpose, and provisions of those agreements.127
120. See id. ¶¶ 11 (detailing Mrs. Airey’s difficulties in obtaining a divorce without
the assistance of a lawyer in Ireland because of procedural and financial obstacles).
121. See id. ¶¶ 22, 24 (finding that under Article 6 of the ECHR, Mrs. Airey’s ability
to appear in person before the court does not fulfill the right to effective access to the
court because her lack of counsel renders her appearance ineffective).
122. See ECHR, supra note 24, at 6; ICCPR, supra note 18, at 15; UDHR, supra
note 15, at 10 (utilizing similar language to require equality before the courts).
123. See generally Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981)
(applying the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test and only examining domestic law).
124. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31: Nature of the
General Legal Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004) [hereinafter General Comment No. 31]
(forbidding the executive branch from seeking to relieve itself of responsibility for
actions incompatible with the Covenant by pointing to the fact that it was another
branch of government that acted).
125. See ICCPR, supra note 18 (enacting binding obligations upon the United States
that cannot be derogated from under the Vienna Convention); CERD, supra note 29
(same); OAS Charter, supra note 8 (same); ADR, supra note 38 (same).
126. See Ramos v. United States, Case P4446/02, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report
No. 61/03, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118, doc. 70 rev. 2 at 457 (2003) (applying the OAS
Charter and ADR to the United States).
127. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 26-27, 31, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention];
see also Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 533 (2008) (Stevens, J. concurring) (arguing
that non-self-executing treaties still create international obligations); U.N. Human
Rights Comm., General Comment No. 24: Issues Relating to Reservations Made upon
Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in
Relation to Declarations under Article 41 of the Covenant U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (Apr. 11, 1994) (explaining the interpretive roles of the
Vienna Convention and the Committee when determining the validity of a country’s
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Even in the case of the ICESCR, CRC, and CEDAW, where the United
States is a signatory but not a state party by means of ratification, under
international law, that signature creates an obligation to act in good faith
and refrain from actions that would defeat the agreement’s object and
purpose.128 In addition, because the ICESCR, CRC, and CEDAW have
been nearly universally ratified, the rights they enshrine have entered the
normative framework of customary international law and are, therefore, a
part of United States law.129
The United States’ decision to adhere to Lassiter functionally deprives
people of a means to realize their basic human rights.130 These basic rights
are at the heart of the international agreements that bind the United States,
and the failure to respect, protect, and fulfill them contravenes the object
and purpose of those agreements.131 For example, the right to education is
a basic human right denied full realization because children in truancy
proceedings are not provided counsel.132 The right to shelter is a basic
human right denied full realization because Americans facing home
foreclosures have no right to counsel.133
The United States cannot pretend that customary international law does
reservations to the ICCPR).
128. See Vienna Convention, supra note 127, at arts. 10, 18 (applicable to the
ICESCR, CRC, and CEDAW); U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, The Limburg
Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1987/17 (Jan. 8, 1987) [hereinafter
Limburg Principles] (affirming the Vienna Convention’s applicability to the ICESCR).
129. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 533 (Stevens, J. concurring) (arguing that customary
international law is part of domestic law); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700
(1900) (defining the law of nations and incorporating it into domestic law); The
Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815) (finding that the law of nations is a part of
domestic law that binds the Court); Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (holding that acts of Congress should never be construed to
violate the law of nations if there are other possible constructions); Douglas J. Feith,
Obama Embraces ‘Transnational’ Law, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 2011,
http://www.dougfeith.com/docs/2011_03_23_Obama_Embraces_Transnational_Law.p
df (criticizing President Obama’s acceptance of Protocol 1 of the Geneva Convention
as legally binding upon the United States, despite non-ratification, because the Protocol
has attained customary international law status); infra Appendix 3 (listing instances
where United States courts cite international law).
130. See Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 68651 (West 2011)
(noting that legal representation is critical to protecting basic human needs and
reducing reliance on other state services).
131. See UDHR, supra note 15 (describing the rights every person is entitled to by
virtue of their humanity, which all states must endeavor to protect); ICESCR, supra
note 17 (same); ICCPR, supra note 18 (same); CRC, supra note 31 (same); CEDAW,
supra note 31 (same); CERD, supra note 11 (same); OAS Charter, supra note 8
(same); ADR, supra note 38 (same).
132. See ICESCR, supra note 17, at art. 14 (defining the right to education); OAS
Charter, supra note 8, at art. 49 (same).
133. See ICESCR, supra note 17, at art. 11 (defining the right to housing); OAS
Charter, supra note 8, at art. 34 (same).
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not apply domestically; federal and state courts have acted to the
contrary.134 The United States cannot pretend that a distinction exists
between civil and political rights and economic, social, and cultural rights,
making one justiciable and the other not; the world has decided
otherwise.135 The Lassiter Court’s failure to recognize this dug a hole in
the sand that the United States has stuck its head in ever since.
The Lassiter decision has wrongly been treated as the last word on the
right to counsel in civil cases in the United States.136 This is not so. The
Court’s decision simply shifted the obligation to act to the executive or
legislative branch.137 Despite the actions of the judiciary, the United States
still must ensure that the requirements of international agreements are met
and adequate civil legal aid is available in the United States.138 In this
regard, the United States has failed.
B. Existing Legal Aid Mechanisms Fail to Satisfy International
Obligations Because They Do Not Provide Levels of Assistance That Are
Adequate to Protect the Human Rights the United States Must Uphold.
The United States has the ability to provide civil legal aid in compliance
with its international obligations.139 Instead, the United States has not only
ignored this duty, but has actively worked against its fulfillment.140 The
LSC, the only national-level mechanism for providing civil legal aid, is

134. See infra Appendix 3 (listing domestic court cases where international law has
been considered and applied).
135. World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna Declaration
and Program of Action, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/23 (July 12, 1993) (calling on the
world community to recognize that all human rights are indivisible, interdependent, and
interrelated and must be treated in a fair and equal manner, with the same emphasis).
136. See also Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011). The Court held that an
indigent defendant had no right to court-appointed counsel when faced with jail-time
for violating a state court order, id., some of the language in the decision has caused
cautious optimism among “civil Gideon” proponents. See, e.g., Turner’s Trumpet:
Child Support and the Right to Counsel, THE ATL., June 21, 2011,
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/06/turners-trumpet-child-supportand-the-right-to-counsel/240753/ (noting that the decision requires additional
safeguards and the potential provision of counsel to indigents in certain situations).
137. See General Comment No. 31, supra note 124, ¶ 4 (noting that the actions of
one branch of government do not excuse the executive branch of its responsibilities).
138. See id. (reminding states that they cannot derogate from their obligations and
duties under the Covenant).
139. See U.N. COMM’N ON LEGAL EMPOWERMENT OF THE POOR, supra note 14
(describing ways that states can meet their international obligations by utilizing nonlawyers and holistic legal empowerment of the poor techniques).
140. See Omnibus Consolidated Recessions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L.
104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (restricting LSC activities); Legal Services Corporation
Act, Pub. L. 93-355, 88 Stat. 378 (1974) (limiting the LSC’s mandate, especially in
comparison to the OEO that it replaced); Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18,
31-33 (1981) (denying a right to counsel in civil cases).
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limited in scope, inadequate in reach, and egregiously underfunded.141
Admirably, a number of states, law schools, and non-profit organizations
have been trying to fill this gap for decades.142 Unfortunately, they too are
unable to meet the level of need present.143 The result is the lack of an
adequate national legal aid scheme, which is a violation of international
law.144
1. The LSC Does Not Represent a Good Faith Effort by the United States to
Provide Legal Aid Because it is So Severely Restricted and Underfunded
That it Cannot Provide Minimum Access to Legal Aid.
Anemic funding and a shrunken mandate have reduced the LSC to an
organization unable to provide minimum access to legal aid in the United
States.145 This violates international law because it represents a failure by
the United States to “respect,” “protect,” and “fulfill” the rights found in
the international agreements by which it is bound.146 America is not
fulfilling its obligations to act with due speed and to the best of its financial
abilities to ensure a minimum level of access to legal aid.147
Since 1982, the LSC has been so underfunded that, according to its own
standards, it has been unable to provide even “minimum access” to legal
aid.148 Minimum access represents the absolute minimum level of service
141. See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES: LOW-INCOME CLIENTS
HAVE NOWHERE TO TURN AMID THE ECONOMIC CRISIS (2010), available at
http://brennan.3cdn.net/ed5d847dfcf163a02a_exm6b5vya.pdf
(detailing
the
underfunded and over-demanded state of civil legal aid across states, which has
resulted in an increase in pro se litigants, who are less successful than those who have
legal assistance).
142. See, e.g., Community and Economic Development Law Clinic, AM. UNIV.
WASH. COLL. OF LAW, http://www.wcl.american.edu/clinical/community.cfm (last
visited Nov. 25, 2011) (providing free legal assistance to people and organizations
engaged in neighborhood-based community development).
143. See JUSTICE GAP 07, supra note 81 (describing the overall state of civil legal
need in the United States and finding that across states, at least eighty percent of need
is unmet).
144. See generally Raven, supra note 6 (contrasting the situation in the United
States with the more developed civil legal aid schemes around the world).
145. See JUSTICE GAP 09, supra note 2, at 9-12 (describing years of under-funding
and limited assistance coverage).
146. See ICESCR, supra note 17 (defining “respect” as refraining from conduct that
hinders the enjoyment of rights, “protect” as preventing violations of rights by
individuals or non-state actors, and “fulfill” as taking positive actions to ensure the
realization of rights and the availability of remedies for violations); ICCPR, supra note
18 (same); CRC, supra note 31 (same); CEDAW, supra note 31 (same); CERD, supra
note 29 (same); OAS Charter, supra note 8 (same); ADR, supra note 38 (same).
147. See U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3:
The Nature of States Parties Obligations, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990)
[hereinafter General Comment No. 3] (explaining that states must budget and request
international assistance so that they can take immediate steps to fulfill their obligations
under the Covenant).
148. See JUSTICE GAP 07, supra note 81, at 1-2 (defining “minimum access” as two
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coverage that the LSC could provide and still be able to claim that the
United States is providing civil legal aid.149 Perversely, as the very need
for such aid in the United States has grown, funding and availability have
fallen.150 For every two people seeking assistance from an LSC-funded
program, one is turned away due to a lack of resources.151
This does not represent a good faith effort by the United States to abide
by its international agreements.152 The provision of civil legal aid is a
necessary condition for the full realization of the rights guaranteed by
international agreements that bind the United States.153 Accordingly, while
the agreements recognize that the full realization of the rights they protect
will occur gradually, the United States is still required to act immediately to
facilitate the process of that realization.154
The ESCR Committee has explicitly rebutted interpretations of the
Covenant that attempt to frame truncated efforts to fully realize economic,
social, and cultural rights as total compliance.155 In General Comment 3,
the Committee makes clear that taking steps does not mean dragging
feet.156 Gradual realization is to be accomplished through the immediate
lawyers for every 10,000 low-income people, and noting that this level of funding has
been achieved only once, in 1981).
149. See id. (noting, however, that “minimum access” is not seen as sufficient, but
rather represents a preliminary foundation upon which other resources could be
layered).
150. See id. (explaining that “minimum access” has only been achieved from 19811982); see also BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, supra note 141 (detailing the growing
need and falling funding).
151. See JUSTICE GAP 09, supra note 2, at preface (describing the disparity in the
availability of attorneys for low-income people compared to those above the LSC’s
poverty threshold).
152. See generally Vienna Convention, supra note 127 (requiring a good faith effort
by the United States to adhere to the object and purpose of agreements it has signed or
ratified).
153. See Inter-American Commission, supra note 42, ¶ 6 (noting that providing free
legal services prevents the infringement of the rights to a fair trial and to effective
judicial protection, both of which are part of the essential preconditions that ensure the
protection of other rights).
154. Compare CERD, supra note 11, at 2 (“undertake to pursue by all appropriate
means and without delay a policy of eliminating racial discrimination”), and CEDAW,
supra note 31, at 2 (“pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of
eliminating discrimination against women”), with CRC, supra note 31, at 4
(“[U]ndertake all appropriate legislative, administrative, and other measures for the
implementation of the rights recognized in the present Convention.”). All three
conventions then detail the actions states must take to comply.
155. See General Comment No. 3, supra note 147, ¶ 9 (requiring states to take
immediate steps that are substantive and will eventually allow for the full realization of
rights).
156. See id. ¶ 9 (noting that progressive realization is informed by the overall
purpose of the Covenant, which is to realize and protect economic, social and cultural
rights); see also Limburg Principles, supra note 128, ¶¶ 16-20 (requiring states to act as
expeditiously as possible).
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adoption of legislation, provision of judicial remedies, and undertaking of
other means in a manner as “expeditiously and effectively as possible.”157
Financial constraints are no excuse either, as the United States is expected
to fulfill this obligation to the “maximum of its available resources.”158
Full realization may be gradual because of the nature of the rights, but the
steps towards that realization must be undertaken immediately.159
The ICCPR also requires immediate action by the United States.160 The
duty to act takes immediate effect and is not mitigated by political,
economic, social, or cultural concerns.161 It is no excuse that national laws
or the actions of a branch of government are incompatible with the
provisions of the Covenant; the United States cannot invoke the Supreme
Court’s decision in Lassiter to justify a failure to perform its duties under
the Covenant.162
The Inter-American System is similarly demanding of the United
States.163 The obligation to protect the rights guaranteed by the OAS’
binding foundational documents requires the United States to act
immediately.164 This obligation is not blind to economic concerns, but still
requires the United States to guarantee a minimum threshold of rights and
to match the depth of services with economic ability.165
The United States is the richest country on earth, yet has underfunded its

157. See General Comment No. 3, supra note 147, ¶¶ 2-5, 7-9; Limburg Principles,
supra note 128, ¶¶ 21-24.
158. See General Comment No. 3, supra note 147, ¶ 10; see also Limburg
Principles, supra note 128, ¶¶ 25-28.
159. See General Comment No. 3, supra note 147, ¶ 9 (reminding states that
immediate action is required and any retrogression must be fully justified in reference
to the Covenant and the financial abilities of the state).
160. See ICCPR, supra note 18, at 2 (requiring states to undertake all necessary
steps to give effect to the rights recognized in the Covenant).
161. See General Comment No. 31, supra note 124, ¶ 14 (noting that the duty to act
takes effect immediately and is unqualified, and that a failure to act cannot be justified).
162. See id. ¶ 4 (reminding states that the obligations of the Covenant are binding on
the state as a whole, which includes all branches of government and all governmental
authorities).
163. See Inter-American Commission, supra note 42, ¶ 56 (advising states that the
Inter-American system not only encourages the general practice of providing free legal
assistance to indigents, but also requires states to immediately do so under defined
circumstances).
164. See Inter-American Comm’n on Human Rights, Annual Report of the InterAmerican Comm’n on Human Rights 1993 (11 Feb. 1994), OEA/Ser.L./V.85, Chap.
5(II), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/93eng/chap.5.htm (noting that the
principle of progressivity still requires states to take immediate steps to attain the full
realization of the rights they have pledged to uphold under the Inter-American system).
165. See id. (recognizing that a state’s level of development will impact its ability to
implement rights, but explaining that the principle of progressivity requires states to act
to the best of their abilities, and as their development increases, so must their efforts to
implement rights).
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only federal civil legal aid program for twenty-nine years and counting.166
This flagrantly violates its legal obligation to act as expeditiously and
effectively as possible to the maximum of available resources.167 The
LSC’s 2012 funding request of $516.55 million represents about .0002% of
the United States budget and could surely be prioritized and increased.168
In addition to the violations of international law that result from
underfunding the LSC, restrictions on its activities both practically prevent
and actively frustrate compliance with international law.169 The restrictions
Congress has attached to LSC funding not only limit what legal aid
organizations can do with LSC money, they also limit what those
organizations can do if they accept LSC money.170 In the United States,
even where a right is fundamental or a proceeding is complex, indigents
have no guarantee of access to counsel in civil cases.171 These purposeful
limitations and reductions in the provision of civil legal aid frustrate the
object and purpose of the international agreements that bind the United
States.172
2. Non-federal Legal Aid Efforts Are Also Inadequate Because They
Similarly Fail to Provide Adequate Access to Assistance Relative to
Demonstrated Need.
State and private actors have attempted to fill the gap left by the LSC,

166. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 77, at 1 (requesting an increase in funding
of $96.6 million, which is still less than would be required to provide minimum
access); Edward A. Adams, ABA Protests Proposed Cuts to Legal Services Funding,
J.,
Feb.
14,
2011,
available
at
A.B.A.
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/aba_protests_proposed_cuts_to_legal_services
_funding/ (protesting a proposed 28% cut in LSC funding).
167. See General Comment No. 3, supra note 147, ¶¶ 2-5, 7-10 (expanding on the
concept of “progressive realization” and providing examples of legislative, judicial, and
financial action required to comply with this concept).
168. Compare LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 77, at 1 (requesting a $96.6 million
increase over the previous year’s funding), with OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FISCAL
YEAR 2012 BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT A NEW ERA OF RESPONSIBILITY:
RENEWING
AMERICA’S
PROMISE
119-20
(2010),
available
at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy11/pdf/summary.pdf
(summarizing
the
President’s federal budget request totaling $3.55 trillion).
169. See Omnibus Consolidated Recessions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-134, § 503 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (forcing the LSC to use a competitive
bidding process).
170. See id. (imposing restrictions on legal aid organizations that could apply not
only to activities funded with LSC money but to activities funded from other sources as
well).
171. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981) (holding that
there is a presumption against the right to counsel in a civil proceeding).
172. See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 127
(expressing the international standard that states which sign or ratify an international
agreement may not act in ways that contravene that agreement’s object or purpose).
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but their efforts still fall short.173 At the state level, legal aid organizations
and judges have tried to take action on access to justice issues, but they
have been frustrated by funding shortfalls and apathy.174 Efforts to
implement statewide civil legal aid programs are encouraging, but only a
few state laws have been proposed, and they are either narrow in
mandate—only mortgage foreclosures or parental rights proceedings—or
are still in the pilot phase and will depend on further funding and
implementation.175
Law schools provide services through clinical
programs and outreach efforts, but these programs are limited in the
number of clients they can serve.176 Recent attacks by legislators and
interest groups unhappy with legal clinic activities may shrink this
assistance even further.177 The shortcomings of national efforts to provide
legal aid are echoed at the state level—funding shortages and restrictions
combine to produce a patchwork system that also fails to meet international
requirements.178
C. The Indigent Criminal Legal Aid System is a Bad Model that Would Not
Satisfy International Law Because it Relies Exclusively on Lawyers and is
Ill-Suited to the Provision of Services on the Scale that a Civil System
Would Require.
Civil legal aid cannot take the form of criminal legal aid. America’s
public defender model, which has proven itself to be a broken system, is illsuited to the civil context.179 To satisfy international law, America’s civil
173. See generally BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, supra note 141 (describing unmet
need that is persistent over time and across states).
174. See id. (detailing nation-wide state-level funding cuts that have severely
undermined service delivery); see also, e.g., John Eligon, New York’s Chief Judge
Seeks More Legal Aid for Civil Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/29/nyregion/29civil.html?_r=4&partner=rss&emc=rs
s (reporting on a series of hearings by Judge Lippman to raise awareness about the need
to increase civil legal aid).
175. See Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 68651 (West 2011)
(establishing a limited pilot project to test the feasibility, cost, and effectiveness of
implementing a civil right to counsel in California with funding guaranteed through
2017).
176. See, e.g., Statistical Information, SMALL BUS. LEGAL CLINIC LEWIS & CLARK
LAW
SCH.,
http://www.lclark.edu/law/centers/small_business_legal_clinic/about/clients/statistics/
(last visited Nov. 25, 2011) (listing statistical information showing that the clinic serves
around 120 clients yearly).
177. See Ian Urbina, State Law Clinics Face a Backlash, N.Y. TIMES, April 3, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/04/us/04lawschool.html?pagewanted=1&th&emc=th
(reporting on criticisms and attacks on law school clinics).
178. See generally BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, supra note 141 (describing unmet
needs, funding shortages, and the combined effect of such across states).
179. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just: The Rationing and Denial
of Legal Services to the Poor when Life and Liberty are at Stake, 1997 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 783, 784, 788-89 (1999) (describing the failure of the indigent criminal
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legal aid scheme must ensure that access to assistance, and the assistance
itself rise, to the level required to ensure the protection and realization of
human rights.180
International interpretive bodies have construed the obligations
incumbent upon the United States to mean that where basic human needs
are at stake or overwhelming complexity is present, a lawyer is required.181
In other instances, assistance is still mandated to ensure the protection of
rights, but may not necessitate a lawyer.182
A civil legal aid scheme modeled after the criminal public defender
system would not meet those parameters because the public defender
system relies overwhelmingly on lawyers.183 The public defender system is
a steak knife and adequate civil legal aid requires an entire place setting. A
lawyer is not always the appropriate implement, so a civil legal aid system
should not rely on lawyers exclusively.184 Where basic human needs are
not at stake or procedures or issues are relatively simple, the services of a
lawyer are unnecessary, prohibitively costly, and not required by
international law.185
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
A. The United States Should Implement Lessons and Techniques from the
Legal Empowerment of the Poor Model.
Legal Empowerment of the Poor (LEP) is a method of creating systemic
defense system to adequately serve the needs of those accused of a crime).
180. See Inter-American Commission, supra note 42, ¶ 55 (detailing requirements
under the Inter-American system).
181. See CERD Report USA, supra note 35, ¶ 22 (recommending that the United
States make legal aid available to racial, ethnic, and national minorities when basic
human needs are at stake); General Comment No. 7, supra note 20, ¶ 15
(recommending the provision of counsel so that people forcibly evicted from their
home in violation of the right to housing can seek redress from the courts); InterAmerican Commission, supra note 42 (listing complexity as a factor supporting the
provision of counsel).
182. See General Comment No. 32, supra note 21, ¶¶ 10-14 (encouraging states to
provide free legal aid, but noting that in some instances lesser steps such as eliminating
fees may be sufficient to ensure the protection of rights); General Recommendation No.
31, supra note 33, at IIC(17)b (citing legal help centers, legal information centers, and
centers for reconciliation and mediation as permissible methods of providing legal aid
in some circumstances).
183. See,
e.g.,
Services,
L.A.
PUBLIC
DEFENDERS
OFFICE,
http://pd.co.la.ca.us/Services.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2011) (indicating that in an
office of over 1,000 employees, over 700 are lawyers).
184. See Bok, supra note 95, at 583 (arguing for the expanded use of paralegals to
increase the efficiency in the legal system).
185. See General Comment No. 32, supra note 21, ¶¶ 10-14 (noting that the
provision of a lawyer is only required in some circumstances, so long as other forms of
aid adequately protect civil and political rights).
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change by using the law, the legal system, and legal services as tools of
empowerment that enable the poor and marginalized to protect and advance
their rights and interests.186 In this sense, the philosophy of LEP
complements the international obligations of the United States, because
LEP is at its core a technique for the realization of rights.187 Distinctive
among its features is a belief in community-based organizing and a bottomup approach to problem solving that uses locally-based actors to effect
locally-controlled change.188 This process is instrumental in ensuring the
actual enforcement of existing laws that protect human rights and in giving
a voice to the poor and disadvantaged when it comes to reforming laws and
regulations.189 This often means using non-lawyers, such as communitybased paralegals, to provide legal services where a lawyer is either
unnecessary, too expensive, or impossible to provide.190 Using these
techniques, LEP projects have been able to resolve hundreds of thousands
of civil cases in some of the least developed, poorest places on earth.191
LEP is a proven and effective method of delivering legal services that
should be applied in the United States. The expanded use of paralegals,
social workers, mediators, advice centers, and technology in a holistic LEP
effort would allow the United States to meet its international obligations.192
LEP techniques are neither radical nor expensive and could easily be

186. See U.N. COMM’N ON LEGAL EMPOWERMENT OF THE POOR, supra note 14, at 3,
25-40 (defining a holistic approach to the provision of legal services that focuses on
bottom-up empowerment of local peoples rather than top-down legal system reform
reliant upon outside experts).
187. See Mona Brother, Legal Empowerment as a New Concept in Development:
Translating Good Ideas into Action, in RIGHTS AND LEGAL EMPOWERMENT IN
ERADICATING POVERTY 47, 54 (Dan Banik ed., 2008) (describing the rights-based
approach to development in LEP).
188. See INT’L DEV. LAW ORG., LEGAL EMPOWERMENT: PRACTITIONER’S
PERSPECTIVES 63, 81, 157, 179, 235 (Stephen Golub ed., 2010) (providing examples of
LEP projects from around the world).
189. See STEPHEN GOLUB, BEYOND RULE OF LAW ORTHODOXY: THE LEGAL
EMPOWERMENT ALTERNATIVE 32 (2003) (noting both the potential and the observed
impact of LEP efforts on the actual implementation of legal reforms and enforcement
of laws).
190. See OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, BETWEEN LAW AND SOCIETY:
PARALEGALS AND THE PROVISION OF JUSTICE SERVICES IN SIERRA LEONE 15-23 (2006),
available
at
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/legal_capacity/articles_publications/publi
cations/between-law-and-society-20100310 (detailing the success of a program in
Sierra Leone that relies on community-based paralegals to provide services to remote
communities where lawyers are non-existent).
191. See INT’L DEV. LAW ORG., supra note 188, at 63, 81 (describing successes in
Bolivia and Sierra Leone, among other places).
192. See General Recommendation No. 31, supra note 33, at IIA-C (requiring states
to ensure the protection of human rights by strengthening the services provided to
disadvantaged parties that access the legal system).
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incorporated into existing institutions and service providers.193 Some of
LEP’s characteristics are familiar from the OEO, the organization replaced
by the LSC, which focused on community activism and holistic services.194
There are even some legal aid organizations practicing these methods
today, which could serve as models for scaling-up these techniques.195
Critics of the state of access to justice in the United States have called for
the expanded use of paralegals for decades, and some states have also
begun to embrace an expanded use of paralegals.196 The reasons for this
are clear. Budgets have always been tight, especially when it comes to
funding civil legal aid.197 Paralegals and non-lawyer legal service
providers are a cheap and effective form of legal aid.198 Beyond this,
though, both are an inexpensive way to realize the economic gains that
come from providing civil legal aid.199 Civil legal aid saves money and
spurs economic growth.200 In an economic downturn, a rights-based
approach to civil legal aid can provide critical savings to state-funded
institutions like courts, homeless shelters, and schools.201 Civil legal aid is
both preventative care that prevents later catastrophe and an effective new
procedure that cures existing ailments.

193. See generally GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO’S
VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992) (arguing for inclusive lawyering that
involves the community in solving legal problems); Nathaniel Whittemore, Legal
(Sept.
9,
2010),
Justice
Goes
Mobile,
CHANGE.ORG
http://news.change.org/stories/legal-justice-goes-mobile (describing a low-cost, phone
based legal information delivery service).
194. See generally The Law: Corporation for the Poor, supra note 75 (contrasting
the LSC and OEO).
195. See Holistic Defense, BRONX DEFENDERS, http://www.bronxdefenders.org/ourwork/holistic-defense (last visited Nov. 25, 2011) (utilizing “social workers, parent
advocates, and community organizers” as part of their legal representation efforts);
RURAL
LEGAL
ASSISTANCE,
INC.,
Services
&
Programs,
CAL.
http://www.crla.org/node/3 (last visited Nov. 25, 2011) (including community outreach
and educational training in their activities).
196. See HAW. SUP. CT. R. 21(b)(10) (2011) (calling for an increase in the
“utilization of paralegals and other non-lawyers in the delivery of civil legal services to
low-income Hawai’i residents”); see also Bok, supra note 95, at 583 (arguing that
efficient access to legal services throughout society will require the imaginative use of
paralegals).
197. See HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 77, at 38 (tracing the funding plight of the
LSC).
198. See GOLUB, supra note 189, at 32 (describing the merits and successes of LEP
techniques worldwide).
199. See infra Appendix 2 (listing studies demonstrating the economic benefits of
civil legal aid both in savings and growth).
200. See id. (listing studies finding a return of between four and seven dollars for
every dollar spent on indigent legal services).
201. See id. (demonstrating that spending on legal aid is a pre-emptive measure that
solves problems before they become more costly).
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B. The Legal Community Can Successfully Integrate Non-Lawyers into
Service Delivery.
Resistance to the expanded use of non-lawyer legal services providers is
shortsighted and unimaginative.202 The stratification of skill levels, duties,
and specializations that would result from expanded paralegal use would
parallel those that already exist in the medical services field.203
Professional organizations, medical schools, hospitals, and legislatures do
not insist that medical services must come first and foremost from
doctors.204 To provide an adequate level of access and service, the medical
community has embraced levels of specialization and care that include
community health workers, EMTs, nurses, nurse practitioners, physician
assistants, doctors, and specialists. Community health workers, which are
most analogous to community-based paralegals, have made dramatic
contributions to the health of the communities they serve.205 Legislation
and accreditation, similar to those used in the medical field, can mitigate
Training and
concerns regarding paralegal skill and liability.206
certification, combined with statutes and professional codes of conduct that
define permissible activities and responsibilities can ensure minimum
202. See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Professionalism in Perspective: Alternative
Approaches to Nonlawyer Practice, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 703 (1996)
(arguing that non-lawyers can effectively provide legal services and describing a
regulatory framework and steps that the legal profession can undertake); Deborah L.
Rhode, The Delivery of Legal Services by Non-Lawyers, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 209
(1990) (discussing the use of non-lawyers as a method of increasing access to justice).
203. Cf. Jay Hancock, Md. Should Make Nurse Practitioners Independent, BALT.
SUN,
Apr.
14,
2010,
http://weblogs.baltimoresun.com/business/hancock/blog/2010/04/md_should_make_nu
rse_practitio.html (noting the evolving role of nurse practitioners as doctor
replacements); Physician Education, Licensure, and Certification, AM. MED. ASS’S,
http://www.ama-assn.org/aps/physcred.html#physed (last visited Nov. 25, 2011)
(explaining the different levels of certification and education required for certain types
of doctors and medical specialists).
204. See GOLUB, supra note 189, at 6 (explaining how a reliance on only lawyers in
the legal field is analogous to a reliance on only urban hospitals and doctors in the
medical field).
205. See Jackline Oluoch, The Community Health Workers Program Receives an
Award for Excellence, MILLENNIUM VILLAGES BLOG (Feb. 8, 2011),
http://blogs.millenniumpromise.org/index.php/2011/02/08/the-community-healthworkers-program-receives-an-award-for-excellence/ (discussing recognition from the
World Health Organization of the successes of a community health-worker program in
reducing child morbidity and mortality).
206. See Sonkita Conteh, Joint Statement on the Draft Legal Aid Bill 2010, SIERRA
EXPRESS MEDIA, Apr. 13, 2010, http://www.sierraexpressmedia.com/archives/7281
(describing a South African bill to authorize the expanded use of paralegals); OPEN
SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, COMMUNITY-BASED PARALEGALS – PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE
41,
120-22
(2010),
available
at
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/legal_capacity/articles_publications/publi
cations/paralegals-manual-20101208/paralegal-guide-20101208.pdf
(noting
that
paralegal programs should seek to cooperate with governmental authorities so as to
gain statutory recognition, as was done in Nigeria, Mongolia, and Hungary).
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standards and establish mechanisms for redressing malpractice.207
V. CONCLUSION
The United States has spent decades failing to provide a level of civil
legal aid that ensures the protection and enjoyment of human rights.208
This failure is more than just unfortunate; it is a violation of international
law.209 The international agreements, which the United States has agreed to
be bound by represent a promise by the United States to respect, protect,
and fulfill the human rights they espouse.210 To honor this promise, the
agreements require the United States to ensure the conditions where the full
realization of those rights is possible.211 Civil legal aid is a means to that
end.212 The form that such a system takes is important only insofar as it
enables that end to be met.213 The public defender model is broken and illsuited to the task.214 Current civil legal aid efforts are inadequate and
underfunded, but the answer is not just more money.215 The methods of
service delivery need to be reevaluated and reformed to ensure compliance
207. See id. at 79-92, 105-113, 120-22 (describing training, monitoring, and
accreditation strategies that ensure quality, consistency, and efficiency of paralegal
BAR.
ASS’N,
programs);
Model
Rules
of
Prof’l
Conduct,
AM.
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rul
es_of_professional_conduct.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2011) (explaining the Model
Rules and tracing their development and adoption by the states).
208. See JUSTICE GAP 09, supra note 2, at 1, 12, 16-18, 28 (documenting the
underfunded, restricted, and inadequate federal legal aid system’s inability to provide
services to all those who need them).
209. See generally OAS Charter, supra note 8 (requiring member states to provide
civil legal aid to ensure the protection of basic human needs and human rights that are
protected under the Inter-American system).
210. See ICESCR, supra note 17, at art. 3 (requiring states to refrain from conduct
that impairs the exercise of rights, prevent violations of those rights by third parties,
and take positive steps to ensure the realization of those rights); see also ICCPR, supra
note 18 (same); CRC, supra note 31, at art. 4 (same); CEDAW, supra note 31, at art. 4
(same); CERD, supra note 29, at art. 2 (same). See generally OAS Charter, supra note
8, at art. 34 (same); ADR, supra note 38 (same).
211. See Inter-American Commission, supra note 42, ¶ 2 (indicating that civil legal
aid’s utility is in its ability to ensure the realization of rights).
212. See id. (recognizing the centrality of equal protection before the law in
realizing human rights).
213. See General Recommendation No. 31, supra note 33, at IIA (emphasizing that
the protection of rights is more important than the means by which that protection is
ensured).
214. See generally Bright, supra note 179 (detailing the woeful state of the
overwhelmed indigent criminal defense system that relies on public defenders who are
unable to handle their case loads); Erik Echolm, Citing Workload, More Public
Defenders are Refusing New Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/09/us/09defender.html (reporting on the refusal of
public defender offices across seven states to take on new cases because of
overwhelming workloads).
215. See generally BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, supra note 141 (documenting
inadequacies and under-funding in civil legal aid across states).
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with international law and norms.216 The LEP international development
model provides useful insights into the ways the United States could reform
its civil legal aid programs to comply with international law and avoid the
failures of current systems.217

216. See Inter-American Commission, supra note 42, ¶¶ 56-65 (indicating the
analysis required to assess the type of legal aid required in a given situation).
217. See GOLUB, supra note 189, at 29-32 (contrasting traditional rule of law
reforms with LEP methods of securing human rights and social justice).
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APPENDIX 1: CIVIL LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES IS INADEQUATE
DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (2004) (providing an overview
of the representation gap in America and detailing, in an empirical study,
the nationwide dearth of pro bono work by lawyers).
MELANCA CLARK & MAGGIE BARRON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE,
FORECLOSURES: A CRISIS IN LEGAL REPRESENTATION (2009), available at
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/foreclosures/ (finding that
across jurisdictions, 60-92% of foreclosure defendants were
unrepresented).
JUSTICE ACTION GRP., JUSTICE FOR ALL: A REPORT OF THE JUSTICE
ACTION GROUP: STATEWIDE ACCESS TO JUSTICE PLANNING INITIATIVE
(2007),
available
at
http://www.mbf.org/JAGReport12-17-07.pdf
(describing the unequal provision of justice in Maine and proposing steps
to remedy the inequalities).
M.D.

ACCESS

JUSTICE COMM’N, INTERIM REPORT AND
(2009),
available
at
http://www.courts.state.md.us/mdatjc/pdfs/interimreport111009.pdf
(explaining the causes and effects of a lack of access to justice in Maryland
and proposing solutions).
TO
RECOMMENDATIONS
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APPENDIX 2: ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF PROVIDING CIVIL LEGAL AID
Economic Benefit of Meeting Civil Legal Needs, NAT’L LEGAL AID &
DEFENDER
ASS’N,
http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Index/000000/000050/document_browse
(a
repository of quantitative reports from states including Florida,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, and
Wisconsin detailing the economic benefits and potential cost-savings of
providing civil legal assistance).
N.Y.C. DEP’T. OF SOC. SERVS., THE HOMELESSNESS PREVENTION
PROGRAM: OUTCOMES AND EFFECTIVENESS (1990) (determining that for
each dollar spent on indigent representation in eviction proceedings the city
saves four dollars in costs related to homelessness).
THE PERRYMAN GRP., THE IMPACT OF LEGAL AID SERVICES ON
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN TEXAS: AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT EFFORTS AND
EXPANSION
POTENTIAL
(2009),
available
at
http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/1236008203.14/FINAL%20Econ%
20Impact%20Study%2002-12-09.pdf (finding that the state economy gains
$7.42 for every dollar spent on indigent civil legal services).
Editorial, Need a Lawyer? Good Luck, N.Y. TIMES, October 15, 2010, at
A32 (discussing costs resulting from lack of representation, such as court
delays and burdened homeless shelters and hospitals).
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APPENDIX 3: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN UNITED STATES COURTS
Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118
(1804) (“[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the
law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”).
The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815) (“[T]he Court is bound
by the law of nations which is part of the law of the land.”).
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (establishing customary
international law as part of domestic United States law).
Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266 (Nov. 20) (describing
regional customary international law).
Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123 (Or. 1981) (discussing the UDHR and
ICCPR in holding that opposite gender prison searches violate the Oregon
Constitution).
Boehm v. Superior Court, 178 Cal. App. 3d 494 (Cal. App. 1986)
(applying provisions of the UDHR to a welfare statute).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S 306 (2003) (Ginsberg, J. & Breyer, J.,
concurring) (referencing international law in a decision finding a law
school’s practice of considering race and ethnicity in admissions
constitutional).
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 533 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(arguing that even if a treaty is not self-executing or implemented by
Congress, it can still create international obligations that influence state
policies).
Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (applying treaty
obligations and customary international law to a federal immigration
statute), rev’d on other grounds sub nom Beharry v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51
(2d Cir. 2003).
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002) (finding the imposition of
the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders to
be unconstitutional, and noting the overwhelming disapproval of this
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practice by the “world community”).
Roper v. Simms, 543 U.S. 551, 574-76 (2005) (overturning Stanford v.
Kentucky, and prohibiting the death penalty for juveniles under eighteen).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576-77 (2003) (overturning Bowers v.
Hardwick, and holding that a statute criminalizing consensual homosexual
sexual conduct violated the Due Process Clause).
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